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We assume that people have beliefs about their abilities, that these
generate self-esteem, and that self-esteem is valued intrinsically. Indi-
viduals face two choices; one of which strictly dominates the other in a
pecuniary sense, but necessarily involves gathering information concerning
one’s (unobserved) ability. We lay out the circumstances under which an
individual may ﬁnd it rational to reject the dominant choice; an act which,
in social psychology is described as avoiding the situation, but which we
label truth-avoidance. We ﬁnd that the incentive to avoid the truth is
increasing in income and decreasing in self-esteem, the perceived accu-
racy of one’s self-assessment, and the role which luck plays in generating
opportunities.
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11 Introduction
In the standard economic model of individual decision-making, psychological
factors play no role in understanding human behavior. While this approach
has proved useful for predicting and interpreting behavior in a wide variety of
contexts, psychologists have apparently identiﬁed several phenomena that are
not so easily understood under the conventional economic paradigm.
The focus of this paper concerns one such phenomenon, labeled situation-
avoidance by social psychologists; i.e., see Crocker and Park (2003, p. 299). To
an economist, situation-avoidance might be better labeled as truth-avoidance,
as the phenomenon concerns an action (or inaction) that purposely avoids
the acquisition of economically valuable information relating to one’s personal
characteristics–even when the cost of acquiring such information is zero. Need-
less to say, such behavior is logically inconsistent with the basic premises of
conventional economic theory. To social psychologists, however, truth-avoidance
makes perfect sense–once it is recognized that individualsappear to care directly
about how they view themselves; that the acquisition of new information can
aﬀect this view; and that human behavior appears to be governed, at least to
some extent, by a concern for protecting or enhancing one’s self-image. Avoid-
ing the situation (truth-avoidance) is considered the ﬁrst line of defense among
self-esteem management strategies (see Hoyle et. al. 1999, and Crocker and
Park, 2003).
While one could obviously spend a great deal of time debating the relative
merits of these two disparate views, this is not our concern here. Instead, our
approach is to take the psychologists’ view seriously and at face value. We
do this by embedding the underlying psychological assumptions in an other-
wise standard economic model. We then investigate and evaluate the logical
implications of our hybrid theory.
Our economic model is modiﬁed by extending the commodity space over
which preferences are deﬁned to include an object that reﬂects an individual’s
(rational) estimate of his own (unobserved) ability. We label this object self-
esteem. Individuals are confronted with two choices, one of which strictly dom-
inates the other in a pecuniary sense. The dominant strategy is necessarily
associated with gathering information concerning one’s (unobserved) ability.
The dominated strategy (truth-avoidance) foregoes an obvious pecuniary gain
and reveals no information. We restrict belief-formation to be rational (in the
sense of respecting Baye’s rule). As such, individual actions (or inactions) in-
ﬂuence the evolution of one’s self-assessment over time. For individuals that
do not value self-esteem, the evolution of this self-assessment is immaterial (the
dominant strategy is always preferred). However, under some very speciﬁc cir-
cumstances (to be described below), we demonstrate that truth-avoidance can
be consistent with rational behavior.
If this is all we had to say about rational truth-avoidance, we would not have
written this paper. Despite the simplicity of our model, it provides a rich frame-
2work for analysis. We conﬁrm known results and we establish a number of new
ones. First, the simple fact that people care about self-esteem (or possess ‘ego-
utility,’ to borrow a term from K¨ oszegi, 2006) does not, in itself, imply anything
about behavior. In other words, simply ‘sticking self-esteem into the utility
function’ does not necessarily place restrictions on behavior. Further, we con-
ﬁrm that ‘information-aversion’ is also necessary to generate truth-avoidance.
That is, ‘good news’ that would lead one to revise upward one’s estimate of
one’s ability must be valued less than ‘bad news’ that would lead to an equiv-
alent downward revision (strict concavity of the self-esteem utility function).
We also establish a new and potentially interesting result; namely, that even
ego-utility and information-aversion are not suﬃcient to generate rational truth
avoidance (although, both constitute necessary conditions). Avoiding the truth
further requires that an individual lacks ‘conﬁdence’ in the accuracy of his own
self-assessment. In addition, we establish that truth-avoidance requires that an
individual perceive that future opportunties are driven at least partly by skill
(relative to luck). That is, if opportunities are perceived to be driven entirely
by luck, then gathering information is useless (so that self-esteem is preserved
when the dominant action is chosen).
We go on to characterize the nature of individuals who are likely to dis-
play a propensity for truth-avoidance. We ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, high-
income/wealth individuals are more likely to avoid the truth and that indi-
viduals with high self-esteem are less likely to avoid the truth. In other words,
truth-avoiders tend to be those with incomes that are high relative to the self-
assessment of their own ability. To the extent that income and self-esteem are
not perfectly correlated within a population, the phenomenon of truth-avoidance
is therefore likely to present among all sorts of individuals. We also show that
the propensity for truth avoidance is decreasing in an individual’s‘conﬁdence’ in
the accuracy of self-assessment and the extent to which the individual perceives
future opportunties to be driven by luck. These are all potentially testable im-
plications, given the type of data that is commonly produced by questionnaires
and experiments conducted by psychologists.
These results may be of interest to both economists and social psychologists.
For the economist, our ﬁndings suggest that the traditional practice of ignoring
psychological factors like self-esteem may be justiﬁed in some circumstances
but not others. These circumstances include environments where individuals
are likely to be suﬃciently conﬁdent in the accuracy of their self-assessment
(which is not the same thing as saying that they are necessarily accurate in
their self-assessment); or when they do not display ‘information aversion.’ For
the psychologist, our ﬁndings identify various individual characteristics that are
likely to render individuals more or less prone to avoiding the truth. Among
other things, the theory developed here may be useful in guiding experimental
design.
Our paper ﬁts within a growing body of theoretical work designed to explain
what, on the surface at least, appears to be ‘anomalous’ economic behavior. One
3strand of this literature simply assumes that individuals are prone to making
cognitive mistakes; e.g., see Rabin and Schrag (1999); and Gervais and Odean
(1999). Another strand of the literature, exempliﬁed by the recent work of
Benabou and Tirole (2002a, 2002b), models the manipulation of self-image as a
strategic game played among time-dated personalities.
Our own approach is most closely related to K¨ oszegi (2001, 2006) and Wein-
berg (2004) who, like ourselves, model self-esteem as ego-utility. Our paper
diﬀers from these primarily in focus and the particular questions addressed.
K¨ oszegi (2006) and Weinberg (2004) are primarily concerned with explaining
how people may rationally become overconﬁdent (something that we do not ad-
dress). K¨ oszegi (2001), on the other hand, explains why it may be rational for
people to avoid reviewing new informationconcerning past decisions, and why it
may be rational to procrastinate in making decisions when there is no pecuniary
gain from doing so. We view our paper as complementary to this literature, as
it simpliﬁes along some dimensions, but delves deeper along others.
2 Basic Model
Consider an economy with people who have preferences deﬁned over lotteries
of consumption c ∈ R. These preferences are represented by an expected utility
function E[u(c)], where E denotes an expectations operator and u00 ≤ 0 < u0.
Each person has an initial endowment (w,z) ∈ R2
+, which is distributed in some
arbitrary manner across the population. The parameter w represents the return
associated with some economic opportunity (the quality of a job, investment,
or mate, etc.), while z represents non-labor income.
Each individual may take one of two actions, which we denote I ∈ {0,1}.
The action I = 0 corresponds to consuming one’s initial endowment, so that
c = w+z. The action I = 1 corresponds to an act that may potentially improve
one’s circumstance. We model this potential improvement as a new opportunity,
whose value w0 is determined by the random process:
w0 = a + e, (1)
where a represents an endowed ‘ability’ and e represents ‘luck.’ Assume that
ability is distributed across the population in a Gaussian manner. Furthermore,
assume that each individual faces an i.i.d. e ∼ N(0,σ2).1
Assume that the action I = 1 entails no pecuniary cost. Assume further that
one always retains the option of discarding the new opportunity w0 in favor of
the old w, so that c = max{w + z,w0 + z}. One interpretation of this model
is that I = 1 represents a job-search activity (with perfect recall), with a wage
oﬀer that depends in part on skill and in part on match-quality. The choice
1Implicitlythen, we allow for negativeconsumption. However, one could guaranteepositive
consumption by assuming instead that c = exp(w) + z. As nothing in our analysis hinges on
this matter, we allow for negative consumption only to simplify notation.
4I = 0 would in this case represent declining the search option. In the language
of social psychology, we want to think of I = 0 as corresponding to ‘situation-
avoidance.’ Given that there is absolutely no cost to ‘facing the situation,’ the
only rational choice here would be I = 1.
2.1 Information and Beliefs
In general, an individual may not know with certainty his or her own true ability
level a. In this case, we assume that individuals are Bayesian. In the present
context, since (a,e) are distributed joint-normally, Bayes’ rule corresponds to
the Kalman ﬁlter.2
That is, imagine that each person begins with a prior (b,Σ), so that one’s
ability is perceived to be distributed normally with mean b and variance Σ =
E[a − b]2. Since b represents a person’s self-assessment of his own ability, we
refer to b as ‘self-esteem.’ Note that Σ is a parameter that describes an indi-
vidual’s ‘conﬁdence’ in his self-assesement. In particular, Σ−1 is referred to as
the precision of the estimate (b), so that Σ−1 = ∞ represents the case of an
individual who is supremely conﬁdent in his self-assessment (which is not to say
that the self-assessment is necessarily correct).
Now, conditional on I = 1, an individual generates a new opportunity w0 =
a + e. Not knowing one’s true ability, however, implies that an individual faces
a signal-extraction problem. Given b and the new information associated with
w0, an individual will update his self-assessment b0 = E [a | b,w0] according to:




Σ + σ2. (3)




Σ + σ2Σ. (4)
Of course, in the case of I = 0 (truth-avoidance), no new informationis gathered
so that:
b
0 = b; (5)
Σ0 = Σ.
Thus, (2) asserts that b0 is given by a convex combination of one’s prior b and
new information w0 (in the case for which I = 1 ). The Kalman-gain variable
k determines how much weight is to be placed on these latter two objects. For
2See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, pp. 65–71).
5a given Σ, we see from (3) that k is decreasing in the ‘noise’ term σ. That is,
if the value of a new opportunity is determined primarily by luck rather than
ability (i.e., a large σ), then any optimal reassessment of ability should largely
ignore new information and rely more heavily on prior beliefs.
As well, note that for a given σ, (3) also reveals that k is a decreasing
function of Σ−1. Recall that Σ−1 measures the (perceived) precision of one’s
current estimate of ability. As Σ → 0, one becomes increasingly ‘conﬁdent’ in
one’s self-assessment, so that k → 0 (it is optimal to ignore noisy information
and rely more heavily on prior beliefs). Equation (4) describes how the precision
of one’s self-assessment evolves.3
Modifying the information structure in this manner aﬀects how individuals
form expectations, but otherwise does not aﬀect behavior (it still remains op-
timal to choose I = 1, regardless of one’s initial condition as summarized by
the triplet (w,b,Σ). To show this formally, let F(w0,b) denote the cumulative
distribution function for w0 conditional on b. Then the expected utility payoﬀ
associated with I = 1 is given by:
E max{u(w + z),u(w0 + z)} =
Z
w
u(w0 + z)F(dw0,b) + F(w,b)u(w + z).
This obviously dominates the utility payoﬀ associated with avoiding the situa-
tion; i.e. E max{u(w + z),u(w0 + z)} ≥ u(w + z).4
3 A Model of Self-Esteem
In the model above, individuals are endowed with some prior b that measures
their self-assessment of their own (unobserved) ability. Individuals are also
endowed with a prior view Σ that measures the perceived precision of their
self-assessment. In the basic model outlined above, neither of these objects play
a role in determining behavior. Such a view is contrary to social psychology,
where the conventional wisdom is that we can not understand individual be-
havior without ﬁrst having an understanding of self-esteem; i.e., see, Leary and
Tangney (2003).
We model the psychologist’s view here by extending the commodity space
to include lotteries over the posterior belief b0, so that preferences can be rep-
resented by an expected utility function:
E [u(c) + λv(b0)]. (6)
The parameter λ ≥ 0 in (6) simply indexes the degree to which a person cares
about his self-image. The model presented earlier is just the special case in
3Extending this model to an inﬁnite horizon, equation (4) implies that inﬁnitely-lived
individuals could potentially learn their true ability (i.e., Σt → 0 as t → ∞ ).
4As one of our referee’s has pointed out, it is crucial here that I = 0 does not depend on
ability, while the return to option I = 1 does.
6which λ = 0. Following K¨ oszegi (2001), we assume that v is strictly increasing
and weakly concave. Strict concavity of v implies that the person displays a
form of ‘information aversion.’ That is, good news that would lead one to revise
upward one’s estimate of one’s ability is valued less than bad news that would
lead to an equivalent downward revision. Because we do not want our results
to hinge on hard-to-interpret third-derivative properties of v, we assume for
simplicity that v takes a quadratic form; i.e.,
v(b) = αb − 0.5βb2; (7)
where α,β ≥ 0 are parameters.5
3.1 Optimal Decision-Making
Consider an individual described by the list of parameters (w,b,Σ,λ,α,β,σ)
describing preferences, technology, and information. This person must make
a choice I ∈ {0,1} to maximize (6) subject to c = max{w0 + z,w + z} and
subject to the rational updating of beliefs (2)-(5).
The utility payoﬀ associated with I = 0 is given by:
V0(w,z,b) = u(w + z) + λv(b). (8)
The expected utility payoﬀ associated with I = 1 is given by:
V1(w,z,b) = E max{u(w0 + z) + λv(b0),u(w + z) + λv(b0)}; (9)
=
Z






u(w0 + z)F(dw0,b) + u(w + z)F(w,b)+ λ
Z
v(b0)F(dw0,b);
where b0 satisﬁes (2).
Observe that, while I = 0 removes the attractive option of potentially up-
grading the value of one’s opportunity, it has the beneﬁt of preserving one’s
self-image (since no information is gathered that would necessarily lead one
to update one’s belief). For obvious reasons, we label such an action truth-
avoidance. Conversely, while I = 1 represents an expected pecuniary gain; such
an action exposes a person to ‘self-image risk.’ To the extent that an individ-
ual cares about self-image, the economically rational (i.e., utility maximizing)
choice is no longer obvious; i.e., depending on parameters, it is possible that
V1(w,z,b) ≷ V0(w,z,b).














5We will also restrict attention to cases where b < α/β, so that v0(b) > 0 always.
7Here, Π represents the net ‘pecuniary’ gain from gathering information and
∆ represents the net ‘non-pecuniary’ beneﬁt associated with preserving one’s
self-image. Note that V1(w,z,b) − V0(w,z,b) ≡ Π(w,z,b) − ∆(b).
Observe that the net pecuniary gain from gathering information is mono-
tonically decreasing in w; i.e.,
∂Π
∂w
= u0(w + z)[F(w,b)− 1] < 0. (12)
Intuitively, the closer one is to the top of the wage distribution, the less likely
one is to draw a new opportunity that dominates the one in hand. Note that
this result is independent of the curvature properties of u; i.e., it continues to
hold when u00 = 0 (or u0 = κ > 0 constant). For a given ∆ then, one can
characterize a reservation wage wR satisfying:
Π(wR,z,b) = ∆(b). (13)
The optimal strategy may therefore be expressed as:
I∗ =
￿
0 if wR(z,b) < w ≤ ∞;
1 otherwise.
. (14)
Notice that if ∆(b) ≡ 0 as in the conventional model studied earlier, then
wR = ∞. In other words, it strictly pays to ‘face the situation’ for anyone with
an endowed opportunity w below the upper bound of the wage distribution when
self-esteem is not a factor in the decision-making process. Of course, if ∆ > 0
is a possibility, then wR < ∞ so that, in general, there will be circumstances
in which truth-avoidance consitutes a rational choice. These circumstances are
now described below.
Lemma 1: For v(b) satisfying (7), ∆ = 0.5λβΣ2(σ2 + Σ)−1 ≥ 0.
The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix 1. Notice that ∆ here does
not depend on the level of an individual’s self-esteem level b. Unfortunately,
this result is not a general one, as it depends on the quadratic nature of v.
Nevertheless, the closed-form solution acquired by the quadratic restriction is
revealing, as it demonstrates clearly how ∆ depends on parameters: λ,β,σ and
Σ. It follows as a corollary to Lemma 1 that:
Proposition 1: ∆ = 0.5λβΣ2(σ2+Σ)−1 > 0 if and only if λ > 0,β > 0 Σ > 0,
and σ2 < ∞.
Proposition 1 tells us that rational truth-avoidance is only possible if the
following conditions hold simultaneously: (1) λ > 0 (people value self-esteem);
(2) β > 0 (people are information-averse); (3) Σ > 0 (people are less than fully
8conﬁdent in the accuracy of their self-assessment) ; and (4) σ2 < ∞ (new wage
oﬀers carry some information, or k > 0 if you prefer).
The necessary conditions for truth-avoidance λ > 0, β > 0 are by now well-
known in the literature. A contribution of our analysis is to demonstrate that
while these conditions may be necessary, they are not suﬃcient. In the context
of our model, an additional requirement is that the individual is less than fully
conﬁdent in the accuracy of their self-assessment. To put things another way, a
person who is fully conﬁdent in their self-assessment can in no way be inﬂuenced
by new information to reassess his perceived ability. An ‘unlucky’ wage draw
will in this case necessarily be attributed to bad luck and not to any personal
shortcomings; i.e., there can be no self-esteem risk.
4 Characteristics of Truth-Avoiders
In this section, we attempt to ﬂesh out some of the characteristics of truth-
avoiders. Our approach here is to consider a population of individuals that are
identical in every respect except alongone particular dimension in the parameter
vector (w,z,b,Σ,λ,α,β,σ). Of course, the analysis that follows assumes that
∆ > 0.
4.1 Value of Endowments
Imagine a population of individuals who diﬀer only in terms of the value of their
current economic opportunity w. It follows directly from the optimal strategy
described by (14) that:
Proposition 2: (Ceteris paribus) Truth-avoiders will be concentrated among
those who are currently endowed with relatively good economic opportuni-
ties.
At ﬁrst, this result may sound surprising; but in fact, the intuition is simple
and follows directly from the fact that Π is monotonically decreasing in w. In
particular, note that while there is no pecuniary cost to gathering information,
the upside from doing so is relatively small for those already close to the top.
Likewise, for those near the bottom, the upside potential is relatively large.
Thus, for a given (b,∆), the former group has a stronger incentive to avoid the
truth. Note that this result does not hinge on the curvature properties of u (in
particular, the result continues to hold even in the case u00 = 0).
Let us now imagine a population of individuals who diﬀer solely in terms
of their endowed ‘wealth’ as measured by z (non-labor income).6 The relevant
6We thank a referee for suggesting this exercise.













u0(w0 + z)F(dw0,b) − u0(w + z)[1 − F(w,b)].
The fact that ∂Π/∂w < 0 has been established in (12). The ﬁrst thing we
can establish is that if individuals are risk-neutral in the sense that u00 = 0 (or
u0 = κ > 0 a constant), then
∂Π
∂z
= κ[1 − F(w,b)] − κ[1 − F(w,b)] = 0.
In other words, the propensity for truth-avoidance is unrelated to wealth when
individuals are risk-neutral. Let us now suppose u00 < 0 and deﬁne κ ≡ u0(w +
z) > 0. It then follows that
Z
w
u0(w0 + z)F(dw0,b) < κ[1 − F(w,b)]
so that ∂Π/∂z < 0, which implies dwR/dz < 0. One can therefore establish
that:
Proposition 3: (Ceteris paribus) If u00 < 0, truth-avoiders will be concentrated
among the rich.
The intuition for this result is also rather straightforward. Given the con-
cavity of u, higher levels of wealth imply that the marginal utility associated
with searching for better options is lower. In other words, there is a sense in
which the wealthly can better aﬀord to take actions (or inactions) that protect
their self-image.
4.2 The Level of Self-Esteem
Imagine now a population that diﬀer only in their prior self-assessment b. The







The fact that ∂Π/∂w < 0 has been established in (12). As F(w,b) denotes
the distribution of wage opportunities conditional on a (perceived) mean b, one
would expect that the net pecuniary gain to gathering information is increas-
ing in b; i.e., that ∂Π/∂b > 0. One can establish this formally by noting that
10F(w,bl) > F(w,bh) for bl < bh (i.e., the former conditional distribution stochas-
tically dominates the latter). It follows then that Π(w,z,bh) > Π(w,z,bl); with
∂Π/∂b > 0 then emerging as one takes bh → bl. As a consequence, it follows
that dwR/db > 0.
In other words, a higher level of self-esteem increases one’s reservation op-
portunity level, thereby reducing the range of values of w for which it makes
sense to engage in truth-avoidance. Someone with high self-esteem ﬁnds it more
costly to engage in truth-avoidance simply because he expects a better outcome
by accepting the signal. From this result, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4: (Ceteris paribus) Truth avoiders will consist of those who are
currently endowed with relatively low self-esteem.
Taken together, Propositions 2 and 4 suggest that the phenomenon of truth-
avoidance is likely to be concentrated among those individuals who are in some
sense ‘doing well’ relative to their self-assessment of ability (i.e., a high w/b
ratio). Thus, our theory suggests that the phenomenon of truth-avoidance is
likely to be found among individuals throughout the income distribution. What
matters in our model is not the level of income or self-esteem; but rather; their
relative magnitudes. This is potentially a testable implication.
4.3 Preferences
Proposition 5: The propensity to avoid the truth is increasing in λ and β.
This non-surprising result follows directly from (14). It is worth repeating
that while psychologists appear to emphasize the parameter λ, the theory here
suggests that some degree of ‘information-aversion’ is required as well. There
are experiments which attempt to measure the aﬀective or emotional response
of individuals to given self-esteem damaging events (Hoyle et. al. 1999 p. 87).
The evidence is that individuals with low self-esteem have a stronger aﬀective
response to a given self-esteem damaging failure.
4.4 Conﬁdence in One’s Self-Assessment
Recall that Σ−1 represents the perceived accuracy of one’s self-assessment. From
Lemma 1, it is easy to verify that ∆ is an increasing function of Σ (i.e., a
decreasing function of Σ−1); this operates through the eﬀect that Σ has on
k in (3). In words, what this means is that among otherwise similar people,
those who are conﬁdent in the accuracy of their self-assessment are less likely
to engage in truth-avoidance.
11Proposition 6: The propensity to avoid the truth is decreasing in the perceived
accuracy of one’s self-assessment.
Proposition 6 suggests that the followingis possible. Consider two people i =
1,2, who are identical in every way except for diﬀerences in (bi,Σi). Suppose that
b1 > b2 and Σ1 > Σ2 = 0. That is, while the type 1 person has relatively high
self-esteem, this high self-assessment is associated with a degree of uncertainty.
The type 2 person, on the other hand, is absolutely conﬁdent in his/her self-
assessment. Our theory asserts that the low-esteem type 2 person will not
practice truth-avoidance; while the high-esteem type 1 person may.
4.5 Noisiness of Information
Proposition 7: The propensity to avoid the truth decreases with the noisiness






Recall that ∂Π/∂w < 0. Also recall that σ2 measures a person’s perception of
the relative role that luck plays in determining the value of future opportunities.
From ∆ in Lemma 1, we have ∂∆/∂σ2 < 0. The intuiton is that the greater the
percieved role of luck (noisy signals) the less costly will it be to expose oneself
to information-gathering activities that may damage self-esteem. From (10) the
eﬀect of σ on Π simply reinforces the eﬀect on ∆ or ∂Π/∂σ2 > 0. The intuition
for this is simple. Observe that an increase in σ represents a mean-preserving
spread of the (normal) distribution F. Since individuals have complete recall, a
mean-preserving spread in F serves to increase the upside potential of gathering
information, without altering the downside risk. Thus, dwR/dσ2 > 0 and an
increase in σ2 leads to a decline in the propensity to avoid the truth.
Propositions 6 and 7 are interesting because they suggest that increases
in “uncertainty” along diﬀerent dimensions can have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
propensity for truth-avoidance. That is, increased uncertainty about how past
events have inﬂuenced the accuracy of one’s current self-assessment (an increase
in Σ) serve to increase truth-avoidance. In contrast, increased uncertainty about
the value of future opportunities serves to decrease truth-avoidance.
5 Conclusion and Extensions
An implication of our simple model is that it identiﬁes several diﬀerent forces
that need to be in operation simultaneously if avoiding the truth is likely to
manifest itself as observed behavior. For rational truth-avoidance to arise, peo-
ple obviously have to care about self-esteem–but in a particular way (they must
12be averse to image-risk). Further, individuals must be less than fully conﬁdent
in the accuracy of their self-assessment and, on top of this, individuals must
believe that luck plays only some role in determining their opportunities. Our
analysis further suggests that the phenomenon of truth-avoidance is likely to be
concentrated among those individuals who are in some sense ‘doing well’ relative
to their self-assessment of ability. We also show that the propensity for truth
avoidance is decreasing in an individual’s ‘conﬁdence’ in the accuracy of self-
assessment and the extent to which the individual perceives future opportunties
to be driven by luck. These are all dimensions that are potentially measurable
with well-designed experiments or other methods. The main point of our pa-
per for psychologists is that theory can be developed to guide the measurement
process.
For the economist, many types of economic behavior probably remain plau-
sibly interpretable within the context of theories that abstract from self-esteem
issues. But there may be some (perhaps even a great number of) phenomena
for which self-esteem issues may play a prominent role. One important example
may concern the question of the optimal design of social insurance mechanisms.
Casual empiricism suggests that when a member of society ‘hits bottom’ (job
loss, divorce, poverty, etc.), low self-esteem becomes an issue. It becomes an
issue because of the possibility that low self-esteem can be self-perpetuating
(e.g. by abstaining from job-search when the costs of doing so are low). In the
context of the theory developed above (extended to many periods), it is possible
for a string of unlucky events to drive one’s self-assessment far below one’s true
ability, ultimately culminating in a state of perpetual truth-avoidance. How
should policy be designed to deal with such a scenario? We believe that this is
a promising area of future research.
Our model was built to study the phenomena of avoiding the situation de-
scribed in the psychology literature. Our approach can be easily extended to
study other self-esteem maintenance strategies. Self-handicapping, is a widely
discussed and experimentally observed phenomena (see Hoyle et. al. (1999)
chapter 6 for references). In describing self-handicapping Shepperd and Arkin
(1989) argue, individuals “... attempt to reduce a threat to esteem by actively
seeking or creating inhibitory conditions that interfere with performance and,
thus, provide a persuasive causal explanation for potential failure.” See Berglas
and Jones (1978) for early experiments on self-handicapping with performance
inhibiting and enhancing drugs. Imagine an individual intentionally taking an
action (e.g. drinking the night before a job interview) which damages their
ability at the interview, lowers a, generating a less informative signal, higher σ,
which results in less updating, lower k, with the goal of protecting self-esteem.
It would be straightforward to model this as a technology which generates the
lower a and higher σ from the handicapping action. Our conjecture is the in-
centive to face the situation, face the situation with handicapping, or avoid the
situation could be directly connected to initial wealth, initial self-esteem, and
the preference and information environment parameters.
13We also view the model as a potentially useful way to begin organizing
one’s thinking over how self-esteem factors into decision-making. Consider, for
example, the relationship between avoiding the situation and self-handicapping
using our model. Avoiding the situation can be interpreted as a special case
of the more general phenomena of self-handicapping. In avoiding the situation,
the individual takes an action (avoids the situation) which damages their ability
so much so that w > w0 in exchange for an uninformative signal, σ → ∞, which
results in no updating, k → 0, with self-esteem fully protected.
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15Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 1:
∆ ≡ λ{v(b) − E[v(b0) | b,Σ]},
where E[• | b,Σ] denotes the expectation conditional on b and Σ. Using the
quadratic form for v, we have:
v(b) = αb − (1/2)βb2;
v(b0) = αb0 − (1/2)β(b0)2;
Observe that:
E[v(b0) | b,Σ] = αE[b0 | b,Σ] − (1/2)βE[(b0)2 | b,Σ];
= αb − (1/2)βE[(b0)2 | b,Σ];





2 | b,Σ] − b
2￿
.
We can now expand the term E[(b0)2 | b,Σ]; i.e.,
E[(b0)2 | b,Σ] = E
h






k2(w0)2 + 2k(1 − k)bw0 + (1 − k)2b2 | b,Σ
￿
;
= k2E[(w0)2 | b,Σ] + 2k(1 − k)bE[w0 | b,Σ] + (1 − k)2b2;
= k2E[(w0)2 | b,Σ] + (1 − k)b2[2k + (1 − k)];
= k2E[(w0)2 | b,Σ] + (1 − k2)b2.
We still need to expand the term E[(w0)2 | b,Σ]; i.e.,






= E[a2 | b,Σ] + 2E[ae0 | b,Σ] + σ2;
Given that a and e0 are independent, we know that E[ae0 | b,Σ] = 0. Moreover,
we also know that E[a2 | b,Σ] = Σ + b2. Consequently, we get that
E[(w0)2 | b,Σ] = b2 + Σ + σ2.
Thus, we are left with:
∆ = λ(1/2)β
￿
(1 − k2)b2 + k2b2k2(σ2 + Σ) − b2￿
;
= λ(1/2)β
Σ2
σ2 + Σ
.
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